Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 4

Article 3

2011

Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex,
Multi-Patent Products
Damien Geradin
Anne Layne-Farrar

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products, 27 Santa Clara High
Tech. L.J. 763 (2010).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol27/iss4/3

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

PATENT VALUE APPORTIONMENT RULES FOR
COMPLEX, MULTI-PATENT PRODUCTS
Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrart
1.

INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of the products developed by the information
complex,
are technologically
industry
technology ("IT")
incorporating hundreds or thousands of different components, and
many of these components read on an increasingly large number of
patents held by a number of third parties.' That is, for instance, the
2
case of personal computers, digital cameras, and smartphones.
Assessing patent value when multiple, complementary patents held by
different patent holders are involved is a complicated exercise, which
may need to be carried out in both litigation (e.g., patent infringement
lawsuits) and non-litigation (e.g., technology licensing) contexts.
U.S. federal patent law authorizes a patentee who successfully
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1. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, I INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 119, 120-21 (2000); Ted Sabety,
Nanotechnology Innovation in the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?, 15 ALB.
L.J. Sci. & TECH. 477, 479 (2005).
2. This problem, however, is not unique to the IT industry, but can also arise in the life
sciences area. See, e.g., Keith 1. Jones, Michael E. Whitham & Philana S. Handler, Problems
with Royalty Rates, Royalty Stacking and Royalty PackingIssues, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT

IN HEALTH AND

AGRICULTURAL

INNOVATION:

A HANDBOOK OF BEST

PRACTICES 1121 (2007), available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/chl l/pO9/.
("Virtually all products now developed using biotechnology, genetic engineering, and chemistry
are technology complex, incorporating many different inputs. While this alone complicates
R&D efforts, there is also the added complexity of potentially relevant intellectual property (IP)
rights held by third parties, attached to these inputs. For example, R&D for a new vaccine might
have used numerous inputs with corresponding third-party proprietary rights attached: research
tools, recombinant techniques, DNA sequences, transformation vectors, cell lines, adjuvants,
and delivery services.").
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proves that its patent has been infringed to recover profits lost or
damages that are due to the infringer's unlawful conduct, "but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty" for the use of the patented
invention. A royalty payment is comprised of two components: a
royalty rate and a royalty base, upon which the rate is applied.4
Defining a reasonable royalty rate is in many ways an art as opposed
to a science, and, as such, rates are perennially the subject of heated
debate.s But the royalty base is not free from controversy. Given the
growing complexity of products, whether the royalty base for a given
patent should include only the component(s) of the product that the
patent directly reads on or the product as a whole seems an important
question that has been hotly debated in courtS6 and also by scholars7
and policy-makers.
Against this background, the objective of this article is not to
review the case law of U.S. federal courts dealing with
apportionment, a task for which we are not qualified, but rather to
offer some thoughts on the economic principles or rules that can be
applied to address the determination of the royalty base and rate in
concrete situations. In this respect, litigation contexts are not the only
circumstances in which patent value apportionment and licensing
rates are disputed-cooperative standard setting is another instance
where multiple complementary patents must be licensed against a

3. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court.").
4.
LARRY M. GOLDSTEIN & BRIAN N. KEARSEY, TECHNOLOGY PATENT LICENSING: AN
INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE ON 21ST CENTURY PATENT LICENSING, PATENT POOLS AND
PATENT PLATFORMS 158 (2004).

5. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007). But see, John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls"
and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION LAW &
ECONOMICS 535 (2008).

6. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-CV-0440, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir.
Jan 4, 2011); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cornell
University v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); IP Innovation L.L.C.
v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D.Tex. 2010).
7. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value
Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2007); Amy Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to
Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual PropertyLaw, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 307
(2006).
8. See Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on, H.R. 1908 Before the Subcomm. On
Courts, Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, , I 10th Congress
(2007).
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single product or service. 9
From a mathematical perspective, of course, the individual
elements of a royalty payment are irrelevant in isolation, as one
variable can adjust with the other. Whether we apply a 1% royalty
rate to a $100 product price or a 10% royalty rate to a $10 value
component, the per unit royalty payment will be $1. What, then, is
behind all of the controversy? What is mathematically clear or
theoretically supportable as compared to what is realistic and practical
in the real world is often (if not typically) an entirely different matter.
Such is the case with royalty determinations, and hence, the dispute
over so-called "apportionment" and "entire market value" rules for
patent value in either licensing or damages situations.10 In one camp
are those who hew to the theoretical ideal, arguing that a royalty base
relying on anything broader than the value of the component(s) at
issue will mislead impressionable juries into granting too-high royalty
rates and excessive damages (in relation to the underlying
contribution from the patented technology)." And indeed, a recent
judgment found that the plaintiff had attempted to use the entire
market value rule in just such a manner, to mislead the jury to a
higher damages figure. 12 In the other camp are those who understand
the mathematical flexibility and/or who recognize the practical
difficulties of actually applying component pricing in many
instances.

1

In this article, we assess the arguments of both camps in the
context of complex, multi-patent, multi-patent holder settings. In such
environments, complementary input problems, which are at the root
of the debate, naturally arise. Among the more famous of these is the
theory of Cournot complements, which establishes that when different
entities supply complementary inputs necessary for the creation of a
single good, both will add their own profit margins to the pricing of
those inputs without fully accounting for the pricing of other inputs.
With each supplier adding its own margin, end user prices will be
9. See, e.g., Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & Jorge Padilla, The Complements
Problem Within StandardSetting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SC. &
TECH. L. 144 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment ofLost Profits in Contemporary Patent
Damages cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using
Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. I
(2008).
11.
See Bensen, supra note 10, at 6; Bensen & White, supra note 10, at 8-9.
12. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-CV-0440, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 4, 2011).
13.

See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW (2005).
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higher, even more than an integrated monopolist would price in order
to maximize its profits. 14 A more recently recognized application of
the complementary input problem is royalty stacking.15 Similar to the
traditional tangible goods that Cournot had in mind back in the 1800s,
this newer theory holds that patent holders will set their royalty rates
without regard to other strictly complementary patent holders,
potentially leading to a cumulative royalty payment for the good's
producer (the licensee) that is so high it no longer makes financial
sense to produce the product.16
Concerns of these sorts have breathed new life into the longstanding apportionment/entire market value debate. If any given
patent licensor can grab more than its reasonable share of the value
commanded by the good in the marketplace, then the other relevant
patent holders may be undercompensated, and more likely, licensees
will face unfairly high licensing costs that eat into their profit margins
or, in extreme cases, make production of the good unprofitable
altogether.
These theoretical concerns are well vetted and well recognized.
But are they really a problem in actual markets? Or, less restrictively,
do they emerge with enough frequency and regularity that they call
for preemptive solutions to be applied? Cross licensing, for instance,
is prevalent in many industries and is acknowledged as a working
solution to royalty stacking.' 7 True, this solution is applicable only for
patent holders with downstream operations (e.g., vertically integrated
14.

See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPALS OF

THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99-116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley ed. 1960)
(1838). See also Nicholas Economides & Steven C. Salop, Competition and Integration Among
Complements, and Network Market Structure, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 105, 106-09 (1992); Hugo
Sonnenschein, The Dual of Duopoly Is Complementary Monopoly: or, Two of Cournot's
Theories Are One, 76 J. POL. ECON. 316, 316-17 (1968).
15. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 122-24, 127-28; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE,
May 1, 1998, at 698-700 (based on a more formal analysis by Michael Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621
(1998)).
16. For a different perspective on royalty stacking, see Geradin et al., supra note 9;
Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION,
Summer 2004, at 54, 55-56 (arguing that private parties often have strong incentives to avoid
harmful outcomes like patent thickets. Private solutions include cross licensing, patent pools,
and the strategic denial of property rights).
17. See Damien Geradin, What's Wrong with Royalties in High Technology Industries?,
COMPETITION POLICY AND PATENT LAW UNDER UNCERTAINTY 12 (Geoffly A. Manne &

Joshua D Wright eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2011); Peter C. Grindley &
David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in
Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REv. 9, 9-10, 24-25 (1997).
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firms), but nonetheless it is a valid market-based resolution. More
broadly, patent holders have no interest in killing the market for their
licenses and thus will not blithely set their licensing terms without
any regard to other patent holders or general market conditions. The
question of the frequency of Cournot complements problems is
therefore essentially an empirical one, but due to the dearth of
publicly available data on licensing, empirical studies are practically
non-existent.' 8 As a result, we cannot ignore the risk of complements
problems arising, given their sound theoretical basis and their
potential to emerge in practice, but we also need to be careful not to
assume that these problems will necessarily emerge every time more
than one patent holder must be licensed. We do not take a stand here
on the frequency question, but it is important to keep it in mind as we
assess the apportionment debate.
Our focus here is an investigation of the issues that practitioners
face in relation to licensing or litigating patents in complex product,
multi-patent holder environments. These issues can be illustrated by
two simple examples. In our first example, Product X is manufactured
by Firm A and is made of 100 components (Cl to C100). We also
assume that technology-heavy Component 2 (C2) potentially
infringes 100 patents (PI to P100), including Patent P5, held by Firm
B. A few weeks after Product X was placed on the market, B sues A
for infringement of P5. This patent is held valid and the product is
determined to infringe it, which leads to the need for determination of
a reasonable royalty rate. B argues that the royalty should be based on
the sales of Product X as a whole (entire market value) whereas A
considers that the royalty should be calculated on a much smaller
basis, namely C2. In our second example, Product Y, which is
manufactured by Firm C, is made of 5 components (Cl to C5), where
C5 implements Standard SI, which involves 1000 potentially
essential patents (P1 to P1000).19 Firm D holds 100 of these 1000
essential patents and enters into negotiation with Firm C. As part of
the licensing agreement, D demands a royalty representing 5% of the
net sales of Product Y to which C disagrees on the ground that this
rate is unreasonable. Both of these scenarios involve complex
questions regarding the determination of a royalty base and a royalty
18. See, e.g., Geradin et al., supra note 9, at 155.
19. We say "potentially" because participants in cooperative standard setting typically
declare patents as potentially essential to the practice of the standard. To determine actual
essentiality, detailed legal and technical reviews are needed, and these are often contested. For
the above example, we assume that 1000 patents have been declared to the standard, but not
evaluated.
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rate, which we seek to highlight in this article.
In the remainder of this article, we present our evaluation of the
above considerations. We begin with the royalty base. In Section II
we offer a few illustrative scenarios that capture the pivotal issues at
play in determining a viable royalty base and review the practical
considerations that must necessarily drive the choice of a royalty
base. We then turn to the appropriate royalty rate, given the chosen
royalty base, in Section III. Section IV discusses some of the
complications that can hinder efficient licensing, like the risk of
willful infringement and concerns over injunctions. Section V
presents our concluding remarks.
We find that the entire market value rule should be applied with
some flexibility. There are reasons beyond the fact that the patented
technology is the basis for demand that warrant setting the royalty
base at the level of the product price, rather than a more narrow
apportioned slice of that product price.20 In setting reasonable royalty
payments, we must keep in mind both licensees and patent holders,
and do our best not to bias the licensing process to one or the other
side. While licensees worry about over compensation for patent
holders deriving from an improper use of the entire market value rule,
if that rule is applied too rigidly, it will lead to under compensation
for patent holders.
II. DETERMINING

AN APPROPRIATE ROYALTY

BASE

As we have seen, once the infringement of a patent has been
established, the U.S. patent statute requires adequate compensation
for use of the invention, and sets a reasonable royalty as the minimum
of this adequate compensation.21 The reasonable royalty is calculated
on a "base" of sales of a particular infringing product or uses of a
particular infringing process.22
The scope of the royalty base can be determined in two principal
ways. The first is a method known as "apportionment." The origin of
the apportionment rule can be traced back to Seymour v. McCormick,
where the Supreme Court held that it would be a "very grave error to
instruct a jury 'that as to the measure of damages the same rule is to
govern, whether the patent covers an entire machine or an
improvement on a machine"'. 2 3 Subsequently, in Westinghouse
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra III.D. (Market Method).
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
See, e.g., Goldstein & Kearsey, supra note 4, at 151-53.
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480,491 (1853).
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Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court
held that:
"[The patentee's] invention may have been used in combination
with valuable improvements made, or other patents appropriated
by the infringer, and each may have jointly, but unequally,
contributed to the profits. In such case, if plaintiffs patent only
created a part of the profits, he is only entitled to recover that part
of the net gains." 24
In practice, this means that when a patent reads on the entirety of
an infringing product, the royalty base should be the total value of the
sales (or use) of that product. By contrast, when the patent at issue
covers only a component of the infringing product, the value of the
sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented
invention and the remaining unpatented components. The
apportionment principle seeks to ensure that the damages awarded to
the patentee are proportionate to the contribution of its invention to
the infringing product, and not based on any value attributable to the
25
infringer's or third parties' inventions.
The second method for calculating the royalty base is the "entire
market value rule," which recognizes that the economic value added
to a product by a patented component may be greater than the value
of the component alone.26 In the Rite-Hite case, the Federal Circuit
confirmed that patent infringement damages should be based on the
full value of the infringing product or process in those instances
where the patented feature is the basis for customer demand for the
entire product or process. 27 What matters for the entire market value

24. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615
(1912). In the Georgia-Pacificcase, the district court identified a list of factors that may be
relevant to determining a reasonable royalty for patent infringement damages, including factor
13, which provides that courts should consider "[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer" when
apportioning damages. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp.
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modiied and affd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 404
U.S. 870 (1971).
25. See, e.g., Bensen, supra note 10, at 11.
26. Id. at 12.
27. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). Besides the fact that the "infringing components must be the
basis for customer demand for the entire machine including the parts beyond the claimed
invention," two additional conditions must be met: "the individual infringing and non-infringing
components must be sold together so that they constitute a functional unit or are parts of a
complete machine or single assembly of parts" and "the individual infringing and non-infringing
components must be analogous to a single functioning unit." See Cornell University v.
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rule is whether the patented component drives demand for the entire
product.28 If that is the case, the entire market value rule permits the
patentee to treat all revenue from the infringing product as an
appropriate royalty base when calculating reasonable royalty
damages.29
That rule, and its extension by courts in the last two decades,30
has been criticized for over-rewarding patentees, especially if applied
to complex, multi-patent products. 3' For example, Love writes that
"[a]s a result of its expansion into a broad exception to the general
rule of apportionment, the entire market value rule often
overcompensates patentees through excessive awards of patent
infringement damages." 32 He then develops an economic model to
demonstrate that "the application of the entire market value rule
overcompensates patentees unless the patent at issue accounts for the
entire value of the accused product to the infringing firm."
Taking Love's model as representative of the general position,
we find that strict arguments against the entire market value rule (e.g.,
those that claim that the rule should only be used in those instances
where the patented component drives the full value of the product)
have two important weaknesses. The first lies in the benchmark of
what a reasonable royalty payment is. Some of those arguing that the
entire market value rule overcompensates patent holders start from a
benchmark biased in favor of infringers over patent holders.34 For
instance, Lemley and Shapiro's analysis of royalty stacking, upon
which Love bases his analysis, sets the benchmark reasonable royalty
payment at *v, where 0 is less than or equal to I and represents the
relative bargaining power of the patent holder vis-A-vis the licensee
and where v represents the value that the patented technology
contributes to the manufacturer's product. Lemley and Shapiro (and
Love) argue that any payment up to and equaling P*v is reasonable,
while any payment that exceeds P*v is excessive, in that it over
rewards the patent holder.3 6 But for any value of 0 less than 1, the
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
28. See, e.g., Bensen, supra note 10, at 34-35.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Landers, supra note 7, at 309.
31. See Love, supra note 7, at 272.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1999; Love, supra note 7, at 273.
35. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1999; Love, supra note 7, at 273.
36. See Lenley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1999; Love, supra note 7, at 273.
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patent holder will not receive the full value contributed by the
patented technology to the product. Advocates of this benchmark do
not acknowledge that any payment less than v, the value that the
patent holder alone is recognized as contributing to the product,
represents an over reward for the licensee. In other words, this
benchmark establishes that it is perfectly legitimate for licensees to
appropriate patent holder value, but patent holders cannot appropriate
any value contributed by the licensee without being accused of setting
excessive royalties. The figure below illustrates the bias in this
assumption.
Figure 1: Symmetric Appropriation of Patent Value
Appropriation of manufacturer
value by patent holder

_

__V

Appropriation of patent holder value
by manufacturer

The dotted line area around v in Figure 1 represents the likely
(and legitimate) disagreement over the precise value contributed by
the patent to the product, as these issues are almost always subjective
and thus hotly debated. The arrows on either side of the dotted line
zone illustrate the symmetric nature of royalty setting. If the payment
is too high (the area to the right of the dotted line zone), the patent
holder will be overcompensated and the licensee will be harmed; if
the payment is too low (the area to the left of the dotted line zone), the
patent holder will be undercompensated, the licensee will appropriate
value that it did not contribute, and the patent holder will be harmed.
Given the uncertain nature of setting royalty payments, especially for
forward royalty payments on new products, error in either direction is
possible and should be kept in mind when deciding whether or not the
entire market value rule is appropriate in a given case.
The second weakness that we see in strict arguments against the
entire market value rule lies in the characterization of the royalty
payment. Love, for instance, treats the royalty payment as an
indivisible whole, set through the P*v determination described
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above.3 But as we note in the introduction, any royalty payment is
comprised of two variables: the royalty rate and the royalty base. 8
The entire market value rule determines the base, but not the rate. In
fact, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) recognized
this flexibility inherent in royalty payment determinations in its
Lucent v. Gateway decision:
Although our law states certain mandatory conditions for applying
the entire market value rule, courts must nevertheless be cognizant
of a fundamental relationship between the entire market value rule
and the calculation of a running royalty damages award. Simply
put, the base used in a running royalty calculation can always be
the value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the
magnitude of the rate is within an acceptable range (as determined
by the evidence).

. .

. Microsoft surely would have little reason to

complain about the supposed application of the entire market value
rule had the jury applied a royalty rate of 0.1% (instead of 8%) to
the market price of the infringing programs.... Thus, even when
the patented invention is a small component of a much larger
commercial product, awarding a reasonable royalty based on either
sale price or number of units sold can be economically
justified.... There is nothing inherently wrong with using the
market value of the entire product, especially when there is no
established market value for the infringing component or feature,
so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base
represented by the infringing component or feature. 39
It is precisely this sort of reasonable approach that we are
attempting to support in this article. It might be that the component
upon which the patent reads is difficult to value separately, making
the entire market value a reasonable starting point. Apportionment
can be a difficult and subjective task; 40 calculating the royalty rate
implied for the entire market value base so that the payment equals
the value determined by an apportionment exercise offers a valid
reasonableness check. 4 1 For ongoing royalty payments, practical
37. Love, supra note 7, at 273.
38. See Goldstein & Kearsey, supra note 4, at 158.
39. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
40. "The apportionment problem-how to determine how much of the 'value added' is
due to the intellectual property at issue in the case, and how much is due to the other
complementary assets (including other intellectual property), skills or risk-taking-is typically
one of the most significant practical problems in doing intellectual property damages analysis."
Edward F. Sherry & David J. Teece, Some Economic Aspects ofIntellectual Property Damages,

573 PLI/PAT 399, 403 (1999).
41. The CAFC has been quick to penalize those that attempt to use such "checks" for
misleading purposes. See, e.g., Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-CV-0440, 2011 WL
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issues like sales verification and reporting enter the calculus as well.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss these rationales for a
flexible view of the entire market value rule. While a royalty base
equal to the value of an individual component can be both the best
and the most practical approach, that conclusion may not always be
warranted. Rigid thinking about the royalty base can lead to
undesirable effects. Relying on the entire market value rule need not
lead to excessive royalties, as acknowledged by the CAFC in the
quote above, and can instead be the most reasonable approach even
when the patented component does not drive the entire market value
of the product.
A. Can the ProductBe Separatedinto Distinct Components?
In many instances, products can be separated into different parts.
For instance, a personal computer (PC) will typically comprise a
monitor, a keyboard, a central processing unit (CPU), a mouse, and
possibly, some speakers or a webcam. But each of these parts will be
made of many components. The CPU will certainly contain a chip (or
several), a hard-drive, CD or DVD ROM drives, and a multitude of
smaller, but sometimes equally important elements. Yet, in some
cases, the product in question may not be so easily unbundled. Think,
for instance, of smart phones. While they include chip(s) that may be
used in other products, and thus can be unbundled relatively easily, a
great deal of the customer-perceived value in these phones comes
from the bundling of a number of features, including calendar
functions, email, a camera, etc. In this case, the sum is greater than its
parts. Moreover, the screen size and quality, the total size and weight
of the phone, the life of the battery, and the phone's physical design
will all have value as well, but will not always be separable from the
phone itself.
Assuming that the product in question can be separated into
distinct components and that the patent in question reads on one
particular component, the next step in the analysis is determining the
"value" of that component. When the particular component is sold in
separate wholesale markets, the royalty base could amount to the
average selling price of that component. Thus, assuming that a CDROM drive sells for $25 and that the patent in question reads only on
the CD-ROM, the obvious choice for the royalty base would amount
to $25. We might need to adjust this figure slightly, say taking an
average selling price (ASP) over the relevant geographic region, or
9738, at *21 (Fed. Cir. Jan 4, 2011).

HeinOnline -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 773 2010-2011

774

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 27

using a wholesale price instead of a retail price, but the general
approach is clear.
Components may not always sell on wholesale markets, though,
and this may be one of the reasons why they are developed in house
rather than bought from third parties. This practical reality limits the
usefulness of the component pricing approach.42 For example,
suppose that a firm holds a patent on a technology that extends a
particular smart phone battery for an additional hour of use before the
phone needs to be recharged. Consumers would clearly value such an
improvement, and the length of use between charging is an important
one in choosing a phone. Typically, the battery is not sold separately
from the phone. Moreover, battery life makes a significant
contribution to the overall phone value, but cannot be said to be the
basis of the entire value of the phone. How, then, should the royalty
base be set? To take an even more complicated scenario, how should
the base be set for a patent that reads not on any single component,
but rather on the interface between components or on the way in
which the components are assembled and work together? Clearly,
there will be many instances where component based pricing is not
attainable, even if it is theoretically desirable.
B. Does the Component in Question "Enable" Other
Components?
As we have seen, the entire market value rule "permits recovery
of damages based on the value of the entire apparatus contained
several features, where the patent related feature is the basis for
customer demand." 4 3 This language suggests a stringent threshold,
where the component is the driving force for demand. The
justification here is clear: when the patented feature is what drives
customers to purchase the product, then the entire market value rule is
most obviously the best approach44 for the royalty base. For example,
a patent on the active ingredient in a pharmaceutical drug would
clearly qualify for the entire market value rule. When the relationship

42. Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1339 ("The license agreements admitted into
evidence . . . highlight how sophisticated parties routinely enter into license agreements that
base the value of the patented inventions as a percentage of the commercial products' sales
prices. There is nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product,
especially when there is no established market value for the infringing component or feature, so
long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing
component or feature.").
43. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
44. See, e.g., Bensen, supra note 10, at 34-35.
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is not so clear cut, critics argue that relying on the entire market value
rule will lead to overcompensation for patent holders. But what about
when the patented component is pivotal to the overall product value,
but not the only feature driving demand?
In some circumstances, an argument can be made that a strict
application of the component pricing rule may actually under-reward
the patentee. For instance, if the component in question "enables"
other components but does not rise to the level of driving demand.
For instance, high-resolution screens allow a wide range of
functionalities in PCs, such as video/movie watching, game playing,
etc, but it would be questionable to assume that customers bought PCs
primarily because of the screen. Similarly, the high data transmission
rate that is allowed by 3G mobile telecommunications standards is
what enables many of the more advanced applications that can be
found in smart phones today, particularly those involving data
transmissions and Internet access, but again, smart phones include a
great deal of other valuable technology in addition to the high speed
radio transmission.
While a particular patented component may not provide "the
basis for customer demand," if the component at issue enables other
components, then limiting the royalty base to the individual
component it reads directly upon is too restrictive. In this case, we
may instead include multiple components in the royalty base. Or, if
that were difficult to do, because valuing a group of components
separately was too subjective, the entire market value approach might
be the most appropriate, with the understanding that the royalty rate
would be set accordingly.
The problem with determining whether one component
"enables" additional components or is "the basis for customer
demand" is that it is likely to involve subjective considerations. For
example, Intel clearly attempted to influence consumer demand for
computers with its "Intel inside" stickers and marketing, 45 but the
extent to which the average consumer was fully aware of any
differences in chips is debatable. As another example, in its day the
sleek RAZR phone caught a lot of consumer attention,46 but that slim
design was only possible given a small sized battery and low profile
45. See Donald G. Norris, Intel Inside' Branding a Component in a Business Market, 8 J.
BUS. & INDUS. MKTG. 14 (1993).
46. Adam Lashinsky, RAZR's Edge, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (June 8, 2006, 9:44 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/06/12/8379239/index.htm; Kent
German, Razr Refresh: Motorola's Fashion Cell Phone, CNET (November 9, 2005),
http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-3504_7-5670915-1.html.
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chipsets inside the phone. More generally, it is only natural that firms
have a rosy view of the contribution their technology makes to a
particular product, which means patent holders will tend to argue for
multiple components or entire market value while manufacturers will
see their contributions as the most important such that third party
patent holders should be limited to a narrow slice of product value.
When a patented feature enables other features, it may, however,
be possible for the patentee to demonstrate that these other features
would simply not work without the enabling feature, hence negatively
affecting the entire value of the product. Patent holder evidence might
be of a technical nature, showing that certain other features will fail if
the component at issue is removed. More commonly, the evidence
will be softer, considering quantities sold and prices charged in the
marketplace. If, for example, the product is sold both with and
without the feature at issue, the valuation process will be relatively
easy, involving a simple price and demand comparison. In other
instances, the feature may have been added relatively recently, so that
demand can be assessed before and after the introduction. In yet other
cases, customer surveys might be used to establish the features that
consumers value most highly. For these reasons, plus all of the other
reasons discussed in this subsection, we argue that product
complexity and "enabling" components are important considerations
in determining whether or not to apply the entire market value rule.
C Taking into Account ReportingNeeds
While the question of attributed value is crucial, we need to keep
in mind more prosaic matters as well. Namely, reporting needs can
dictate, or at least influence, the most appropriate choice of a royalty
base.
Much of the debate over apportionment arises in the context of
litigation. But the determination of the royalty base is also of much
relevance in non-litigation contexts, such as when firms negotiate
licensing agreements. In that context, or when litigation dictates that a
forward running royalty rate be set, we posit that one factor to take
into consideration in the determination of the royalty base concerns
the practicability of the base selected with respect to reporting and
monitoring issues. A patentee's ability to generate revenues through
licensing in great part depends on its ability to collect the fees that are
owed to it by its licensees. That is the reason why licensees are
typically subject to reporting obligations.
For reporting to work efficiently, the base on which royalties are
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calculated must be objective and workable. Indeed, troubles with
observing and verifying sales made in order to determine that
licensees have reported the correct sales base is a significant real
world problem, one that has even led to modifications in the licensing
process and not just the choice of a royalty base. 47 For instance, in an
attempt to reduce underreporting by its global licensees, Philips
introduced per-batch licensing, a program it dubbed "VEEZA", in
place of its previous CD-R Disc Patent License Agreements. 48 With
VEEZA, a separate license is obtained for each shipment. 4 9 The
shipments are marked with a unique code that signals to the traders
and retailers that the merchandise is licensed.o
In regards to the underreporting problem, the average selling
price of the product containing the patented feature offers the greatest
clarity, as those prices often will be observable in public documents.
These prices might be net of discounts, such as volume rebates, if
price concessions are common in the industry involved. Even when
product prices are not public, they will at least be consistently
recorded in the licensee's company documents, although in this case
audits will likely be needed to verify the relevant sales quantities.
Analogously, if an individual component is sold separately (as
computer chips typically are), then the component price can be
appropriate both from a theoretical and a practical point of view.
The point we are making here is not that reporting needs dictate
one particular structure for the royalty base, but rather that practical
concerns such as proper reporting do matter and must be considered
in the apportionment debate. Just as licensees are entitled to pay no
more than fair and reasonable royalty payments, patent holders are
entitled to actually receive the royalty payments properly dictated by
the parameters of an agreed upon license.
III. SETTING REASONABLE ROYALTY RATES

The second variable in the royalty payment calculation is the
royalty rate.51 It is typically a percentage rate and thus reflects the
proportion of the base value that the patented technology

Programs,
Property & Standards, Licensing
47. See Philips Intellectual
https://www.ip.philips.com/services/?module=lpsLicenseProgram&command=View&id=20&p
art-7 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
48. Id

49.

Id

50.
51.

Id
See GOLDSTEIN & KEARSEY, supra note 4, at 158.
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contributes.52 As noted in the introduction, setting reasonable royalty
rates (given a royalty base to which they will apply) involves a good
degree of art.5 3 There is little public data on arms-length patent
licenses to guide us. Moreover, each patent is (at least in theory)
unique, representing a novel contribution to the state of the art, else
the patent office should not have granted the patent. As a result,
pricing a patent royalty rate is much like pricing a work of art: beauty
is in the eye of the beholder.
Licensing situations involving multiple complementary patents
held by separate entities frequently adds another layer of subjectivity
to royalty rate determination. If the two parties know (at least
roughly) how many and which patents read on the product or service
to be produced, then they can assess each patent and apportion royalty
payments accordingly. More commonly, however, a licensee has only
a loose understanding of how many patents are likely to read on its
product/service. For instance, the typical semiconductor chip likely
involves hundreds, perhaps more, patents. In turn, that chip may be
intended for use in a laptop computer, the other components of which
involve hundreds, or more, patents. Without knowing how many
patents actually read on a product, and how many have holders who
will actively seek licensing fees, it can be exceedingly difficult to
assign the contributed value to those that are known. While the parties
may have a working agreement on what the licensee contributes to the
product-through its own know-how, processes, and marketing, for
instance-and what is contributed as a whole by third parties
(although this step will also be negotiated), the number of relevant
third parties will clearly affect what any one of them should receive. 54
While setting "reasonable" royalty rates is clearly subjective, a
number of approaches have emerged in practice to provide a
framework for determining what a reasonable rate is. We summarize
and critique those approaches in this next section.
A. Rule of Thumb
The surprisingly common rule of thumb, which suggests that a
patent be licensed at 5% of the sales revenue or 25% of the operating
profit margin for the good it reads upon,5 5 implicitly assumes that

52. See id. at 156.
53. See supra p. 2.
54. Observe that it is not so much the number of patents that likely read on a given
product, but rather the number of distinct patent holders, as patents can be treated as a bundle.
55. See Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhem, Use Of The 25 Per Cent Rule

HeinOnline -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 778 2010-2011

2011]

PATENT VALUE APPORTIONMENT RULES

779

only one patent holder will emerge for any given product. Not only
does this method fail to even attempt to value the patented technology
and its contribution to a given product,56 but clearly if four or more
patent holders are present and each applies this rule, there would be
no operating profit left for the licensee. In contrast, if a single patent
(or portfolio of patents) contributes the lion share of the entire product
value, 25% of the operating profit margin will be too low. So,
although this method lowers transaction costs (since no analysis is
required at all, by either party), it is wholly unsuited to the complex
cases we have in mind.
It is not surprising, then, that in its in January 2011 decision in
Uniloc USA Inc., the CAFC found that such rules of thumb are not
acceptable by the Court. 5 In the decision, the Court wrote:
This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25
percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.
Evidence relying on the 25 percent rule of thumb is thus
inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the
case at issue. 8
B. NumericalProportionality

One method that does explicitly address the multiplicity problem
is numerical proportionality. 59 According to that method, which has
been proposed in the standardization context but could also be applied
outside that context,60 the royalty entitlement of the holder of patents
in Valuing lP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123 (2002).
56. Rules of thumb also suffer from a number of well known shortcomings. See, e.g.,
HARVARD Bus. SCH., INTELLECTUAL ASSET VALUATION, CASE No. 9-801-192 1, 5 (Dec. 8,

2000) (the case study was based on a paper originally written by Gavin Clarkson, Olin Fellow
for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School).
57. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-CV-0440, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir.
Jan 4, 2011), at *21.
58. Id. at *19.
59. See Damien Geradin, Standardization and Technological Innovation: Some
Reflections on Ex-ante Licensing, FRAND, and the Proper Means to Reward Innovators, 29
WORLD COMPETinON 511, 527-28 (2006) (provides a discussion and critique of papers taking
this position).
60. That approach can be illustrated by the proposal made by some ETSI members
(Nokia, Ericsson, and Motorola) that ETSI's current IPR policy can be revised in order to
introduce the principles of "aggregated reasonable terms" and "proportionality" into the
definition of FRAND. Pursuant to this proposal, called "Minimum Change, Optimal Impact",
Aggregated Reasonable Terms would mean that "in the aggregate the terms are objectively
commercially reasonable taking into account the generally prevailing business conditions
relevant for the standard and applicable product, patents owned by others for the specific
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essential to a standard should be calculated in the light of the
proportional contribution of that patent owner's essential patents
compared to the total contribution of all other essential patents
reading on the standard. For example, if one patent owner declared 10
out of 100 essential patents, and another patent owner declared 20 out
of 100 essential patents, the value of the second patent owner's
essential patent portfolio would be twice as much as the first patent
owner's essential patent portfolio (20% versus 10%).
While on its surface numerical proportionality offers a royalty
rate calculation method that accounts for multiple patent holders, this
approach amounts, in essence, to a simplistic formula that counts
patents and is, therefore, seriously flawed and simply unfit to value
patents.61 First, numerical proportionality unavoidably requires the
determination of a "cumulative royalty cap", or rate ceiling applicable
to all patent holders. 62 The proponents of that method, however,
cannot explain the basis and legitimacy for determining such a
cumulative royalty cap, which would necessarily limit, pursuant to
some unclear basis, the rewards available to innovators.63
Second, numerical proportionality rests on the proposition that
every patent is of equal value6-a proposition that the Competition
Committee of the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs has flatly stated to be "meritless." 65 Specifically, numerical
proportionality ignores the fact that the economic value of a particular
patent or patent portfolio depends on the benefits it provides to the
industry and ultimately consumers, which is far from a function solely
of the number of patents. Clearly, (essential) patents are not equal and
that simple fact makes numerical proportionality meaningless.
Finally, numerical proportionality would inevitably stifle
innovation as it would incentivize firms to seek to generate as many
patents as they could, hence favoring large corporations with
technology, and the estimated value of the specific technology in relation to the necessary
technologies of the product." In turn, proportionality would mean that "compensation under
FRAND must reflect the patent owner's proportion of all essential patents." See "Vendors Seek
Compromise on LTE", Informa Telecoms and Media, 20 March 2006. For a criticism of that
proposal; Geradin, supranote 59, at 527.
61. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Directorate
For Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Policy Roundtables:
Competition, Patentsand Innovation II, DAF/COMP (2009) 22, p. 28 (May 25, 2009).
62. See Geradin, supra note 59, at 529.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 530.
65. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], supra note 61,
at 28.
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extensive IP departments able to file large numbers of marginally
varying patents. If a smaller, innovative entity develops the next new
breakthrough or "core" patent with a value far surpassing all prior
patented technologies, the numerical proportionality formula would
prevent it from being properly rewarded for its investment. With
numerical proportionality, patent attorneys would suddenly become
more important to companies' licensing revenues than its true
innovators.
C. Cost-BasedRate Setting
Added to the list of inappropriate methods is cost-based rate
setting.66 The notion here is that the patent holder's cost of obtaining
67
the invention and its patent forms the basis of the royalty rate. A
profit margin is simply tacked onto the innovation cost.68 This
method would be very hard to implement for at least a couple of
reasons.
First, a major difficulty lies in the determination of the firms'
costs that need to be taken into consideration. Courts and regulators
typically rely on one of the following cost methodologies when asked
to assess whether the price of a product or service is "reasonable":
marginal cost ("MC"), average variable cost per unit ("AVC"),
average total costs ("ATC") or long run average incremental costs
("LRAIC"). The cost methodology selected would obviously have to
take into account the fact that while innovation generates very high
fixed costs, the (variable) cost of granting a license is close to zero.
The relevant cost measure should therefore factor in the R&D
expenditures of the patent holder. But this again would raise
considerable difficulties.
There is also the question of which R&D costs should be taken
into account. Considering only the R&D costs directly linked to the
development of a given technology would be under-inclusive as
innovative firms usually have to engage in dozens of research projects
to develop one successful technology. 69 The costs of failed projects
66. Josh Lerner & Anne Layne-Farrar, Valuing Patents for Licensing: A Practical Survey
of the Literature 8, (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1440292.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Even if an innovator manages to obtain the necessary capital to pursue a given R&D
project, this gives it no guarantee that its investments will bear fruit. Its research may not lead to
any concrete results or may lead to results that may not be subject to commercial exploitation.
While there is obviously no precise data with respect to the success (or failure) rate of R&D
projects, the conventional wisdom is that the vast majority of such projects fail. An additional
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would thus have to be taken into account. Another difficulty arises
from the fact that R&D expenditures are typically "common costs"
when the dominant firm is also active in downstream manufacturing
markets. 70 Hence, while only part of the R&D costs should be
allocated to the licensing activities, finding the adequate allocation
key between manufacturing and licensing activities may prove
insuperable.71 Finally, on technology markets where "incremental
innovations" (minor evolutions of existing technologies) are protected
by intellectual property rights, the question arises whether the R&D
expenditures incurred for the existing technology should be factored
in to the analysis.
Moreover, reliance on a cost-based method would require the
determination of an appropriate "margin" or "rate of return" on
investment. But that margin would have to be much higher that the
low rate of returns allowed to regulated utilities. The innovation
process is indeed risky as it is akin to a painful "trial and error"
process. Firms generally experience a number of setbacks prior to
obtaining a successful patent which can be licensed. Worse,
innovators often incur huge R&D investments which never lead to the
award of a patent and even when a patent is granted there is no
guarantee that it will be commercially significant. 72 The upshot of this
is that when firms hold successful patents, setting royalties well in
excess of R&D costs is a perfectly rational and efficient pricing
problem is that, although frequent, failure is very hard to predict and prevent as its causes can be
numerous (e.g., insufficient resources, unrealistic completion timeframe, loss of key personnel,
failure to obtain authorizations from regulators, etc.) and complex (e.g., technological shifts,
unpredictable changes in the commercial landscape, etc.). Although an innovator can learn from
experience, there is nothing like a failure-proof research project.
70. See STEVEN ANDERMAN & JOHN KALLAUGHER, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE
NEW EU COMPETITION RULES - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AFTER MODERNISATION

(2006).
71. See Michal Gal, Monopoly Pricingas an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC:
Two Systems ofBeliefAbout Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343, (2004) (Some authors have
alluded to that difficulty). See also Shigeki Kamiyamam, Jerry Sheehan, & Catalina Martinez,
Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual Property (Statistical Analysis of Science, Technology
at
Paper,
2006),
available
Industry,
STI
Working
and
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/52/37031481.pdf (the practical difficulty underlined in
OECD).
72. J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief
for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 738 (2008)
(This ties in to the difference between rents and quasi-rents: the latter is the risk-adjusted return
to sunk investment made in risky activities; it may look excessive ex post, but only because one
already has turned the cards over and knows with certainty what was unknown at the time that
bets had to be laid. For further discussion about the difference between rent and quasi rent see
also, J. Gregory Sidak, An Economic Theory of Censorship, II Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 81, 87-88
(2003).).
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policy, one which compensates the failed R&D investments and
provides in turn incentives for further risky investment.n
In addition to the implementation difficulties, there are also
theoretical objections to cost-based royalty rates. Most importantly, a
highly valuable invention that was arrived at through a "stroke of
genius" should command a higher royalty than a minor incremental
improvement, but if the latter cost more, this method could turn the
royalty payments on their ear. As a result, the cost-based approach is
clearly financially naive.7 When multiple patents and patent holders
are involved, it could lead to a much distorted distribution of royalty
payments: the least efficient/knowledgeable patent holders, those with
the highest costs, would receive the highest royalty payments, while
those contributing the "stroke of genius" patents would receive next
to nothing. In addition, this method does not acknowledge the
presence of other complementary patents and so runs the risk of
creating a royalty stack.
D. Market Method
One approach with promise for complex, multi-patent holder
contexts is the market method, where the worth of a patent is
determined by examining the range of prices garnered in the sale of
This is often referred to as the comparables
similar technologies.
The problem, however, lies in finding meaningful
method.
comparable licenses, which can be quite difficult. As already noted,
patents are supposed to be unique, so in practice this method is really
about finding benchmarks to bookend the value of the patents at issue.
Because under this method the prices are grounded in
commercial market value, which will vary depending on the
perceived contribution of the various patents, it can (in theory)
accommodate complex multi-component settings.

73.

ANDERMAN & KALLAUGHER, supranote 70, at 273 (for a similar argument).

74. For a discussion, see F. Russell Denton and Paul Heald, Random Walks, NonCooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV.
1175, 1183-84 (2003). See also Mohammad S. Rahman, Patent Valuation: Impacts on
Damages,6 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (1998).
See, e.g., Morton I. Kamien, PatentLicensing, in HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY 34675.

47 (R.J. Aumann and S. Hart eds) (1st ed. 1992); Gordon V. Smith and Russell L. Parr,
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 202-06 (1989).
Gordon V. Smith and Russell L. Parr, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
76.
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 204-06 (1989).

77.

See supra p. 14.
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E. Discounted Cash Flow
Another well regarded method for valuing patents relies on
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. The method assumes that
patent price can be expressed as the present value of the future stream
of economic benefits derived from ownership, which includes
projected sales of products (or components) based on the patent over
its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared to
competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.7 9
While DCF is a well known and respected financial analysis
tool, in the context of patent valuation, in some ways it merely moves
the source of debate from the royalty rate itself to the stream of
projected sales attributable to the patent. That being said, licensees
often have strategic plans projecting sales, or other commonly
produced company documents, and these can provide a tangible
starting point or anchor for negotiations, as the absolute maximum
that the patent holder could command from the licensee.
F. Georgia Pacific
Finally, and in litigation contexts most importantly, the Georgia
Pacific factors play a key role in royalty rate determination." The
fifteen factors enumerated in the case, several of which repeat
approaches discussed above, are as follows: 8 1
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or nonexclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or
with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to
78. Russell L. Parr and Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing Intellectual
PropertyinTHE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, 58,
58 (1994). Another, far more complex, method for valuing patents is based on options valuation
methods, such as Black-Scholes. The data intensity required for this approach often precludes its
use in common litigation contexts. However, see Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some
Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA, 780 (July
1986).
79. Ariel Pakes, Patentsas Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European
PatentStocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA, 780 (July 1986).

80.
1970).
8 1.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
Id.
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maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed
to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee,
such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the
same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of
other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to
the licensor as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and
the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the
patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old
modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out
similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the
commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the
licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be
customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to
allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to
the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee-which desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a
license to manufacture and selt a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty
and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount
would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing
to grant a license.
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The last of these factors, the so-called hypothetical negotiation, 8 2
is the umbrella under which all of the other factors are considered.
The key points here are picking an appropriate ex ante time at which
to set the negotiation, so that the relevant uncertainties are
acknowledged. While the hypothetical negotiation is presumed to
have occurred prior to any infringement taking place, courts still
allow recognition of ex post realities, like the sales that actually took
place.83
Despite their length and apparent detail, it is important to
understand that the Georgia Pacific factors do not, in fact, prescribe
an exact method for calculating reasonable royalties. Rather, they
offer guidelines against which specific reasonable royalty approaches,
like those listed above, can be evaluated. Judges have considerable
discretion over the particulars involved in royalty rate assessments,
including the choice of an accounting method. 4
IV. A REVIEW OF SOME COMPLEX QUESTIONS

Thus far, we have reviewed the theoretical underpinnings and
some practical limitations that must be kept in mind in comparing the
entire market value rule versus the component rule for determining an
appropriate royalty base. We have also reviewed the more common
frameworks for determining a reasonable royalty rate in the context of
licensing for use in complex products. In this section, we turn to some
institutional features that have a bearing on the apportionment debate.
Specifically, we consider the behavior incentives created by the
willful damages rule, the influence that the availability of injunctive
relief can have on license negotiations, and the general incentives that
licensees face.
A. Treble Damages and the "Catch 22" it Createsfor
Infringers
Without a doubt, the willful infringement laws in the U.S. play a
role in how patents are licensed. Consider infringement litigation
82. Id. at 1120-21.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164-65
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
85. Early U.S. patent law allowed manufacturers to be found to be "willful" infringers
liable for treble damages and attorneys' fees, even if they were unaware of the patent or even of
the patent owner at the time they began commercializing the product. See, e.g., Underwater
Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled en banc by In
re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On willfulness and its problems, see
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over a patent that allegedly reads on a complex product for which the
manufacturer suspects that around 100 patents are relevant. The
manufacturer holds five of those patents and has to date licensed
another five. Let us assume that the manufacturer does not know
exactly which 90 other patents actually read on the product, it simply
believes that many may be relevant but not yet surfaced or
discovered. To put the one patent in perspective for the judge or jury
trying the case, the defendant will certainly point to its own five
patents, along with any unpatented know-how, processes, and
distribution value that it will be contributing, but it also would like be
able to point to the 90 additional third party patents that it believes
exist.
In many ways this defendant faces a "catch 22" situation. Option
1 is for the manufacturer to admit to the court that it should actually
be licensing 90 more third party patents that read on its product, but it
has not yet reached license agreements. The court would thus be able
to put the one patent at issue in the trial into perspective, but the
downside would be huge: this option is tantamount to admitting to
willful infringement of 90 patents, with the attendant treble damages
once the patents are specifically identified. The holders of the 90
patents (or more realistically, holders of another 200 or so patents that
potentially read on the product, 90 of which are expected to be found
to be actually infringed) would emerge the next day, with
infringement suits in hand. Option 2 is to ignore all other third party
patents, arguing instead that the full value of the product can be
apportioned between the licensee and the licensor. In this case, the
one third party patent holder will appear to have made a
disproportionate contribution to the value of the product, which will
likely sway the fact finder into awarding large damages and/or a
relatively high ongoing royalty payment. In this latter case, the
manufacturer still faces the risk that other patent holders will
approach it, as they will be attracted by the relatively high royalty
awarded by the court, but there will be no admission of willful
infringement. Choosing among these two unattractive alternatives
poses a thorny problem for licensees.
Ironically, the potential penalty of treble damages exacerbates
generally Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003). See also Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent
Infringement and Enhanced Damages-Evolutionand Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 97, 97
(2001); Stephanie Pall, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposalto Restore
Willful Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 659, 659
(2006).
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the problem of willful infringement. 86 Legal counsel often advises
clients not to search for patents that might read on a product,
because if a patent is mistakenly discarded as irrelevant, the
manufacturer may open itself up to treble damages because it knew of
the patent and chose not to license it. The rule thus discourages proper
due diligence on the part of licensees and contributes to the problem
of unlicensed contributors to complex products.
It can be relatively harder to go the other direction, from the
patent holder to the manufacturer. This follows because the patent
holder may not be in the same industry, may not have insight into the
exact product specifications the manufacturer is using, and so forth.
As a result, many patents likely go unlicensed. One might think this is
not a problem, as it keeps manufacturer costs down and may therefore
contribute to lower consumer prices. The other side of that story,
however, is that the expectation of not being able to successfully
license a patent will tend to prevent innovations from emerging in the
first instance, particularly for individual inventors and small start up
firms. The more common unwitting infringement is, the lower the
expected value of achieving and licensing an innovation, and thus the
lower the likelihood of investing resources in obtaining that
innovation.
It is important, therefore, for fair rules to govern both sides of the
licensing transaction. Manufacturers should not be at the mercy of a
royalty stack, but patent holders should have meaningful
opportunities to reach reasonable licensing terms when their patents
are indeed infringed.
B. The Role ofInjunctive Relief in Negotiations
The other institutional feature that looms over patent licensing
negotiations is the possibility for an injunction. Patent holders can
wield the threat of an injunction to obtain a license. This threat is
often cited as a reason for licensees "paying too much". 89 For
instance, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro claim that:
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will
force the downstream producer to pull its product from the market

86. See, e.g., Lemley & Tangri, supra note 85, at 1087.
87. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21 ("Companies
and lawyers tell engineers not to read patents in starting their research, lest their knowledge of
the patent disadvantage the company by making it a willful infringer.").
88. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 1993.
89. Id.
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can be very powerful.... Injunction threats often involve a strong
element of holdup in the common circumstance in which the
defendant has already invested heavily to design, manufacture,
market, and sell the product with the allegedly infringing feature.
The threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate
royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic
contribution. 90
Lemley and Shapiro thus plead for narrowing the circumstances
in which injunctive relief should be granted to the patentee.9 1
Specifically, they argue that injunctive relief should be: (i) stayed
(until the infringer has an opportunity to design around the patented
feature) when the value of the patented feature is only a small part of
the value of the final product and (ii) denied when the patent holder is
a non-practicing entity (i.e., a firm that does not practice its patents
by, for instance, manufacturing products).92
Lemley and Shapiro's proposals are, however, based on the
questionable premise that a patent holder's ability to seek injunctive
relief against downstream producers allows it to negotiate excessively
high royalties. 9 3 But that is not necessarily true. As pointed out by
John Golden, one should not lose sight of the fact that the patent
holder negotiates with knowledge that it will be burdened with
significant costs if negotiations fail and that such costs "could drive
the patent holder to settle for substantially less than the patented
invention's more intrinsic economic worth."94 For instance, the patent
holder will face significant litigation costs if negotiations fail and its
patents have to be enforced through the courts, which may not even
be an option if the patent holder is a small company. In addition,
when a patent holder wants to license non-exclusively, its failure to
successfully conclude negotiations with a "first mover" licensee will
significantly undermine its ability to negotiate licenses with other
potential licensees. 95 Thus, although the patent holder may be able to
threaten a potential licensee that it would seek a court injunction if
negotiations broke down, "years of time and a million dollars or so

90. Id.
91. Id. at 2044-45.
92. Id. See also Vincenzo DeNicolo et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief InterpretingeBay
in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. OF COMPETITION L. AND
EcON. 571 (2008) (containing a rebuttal of Lemley and Shapiro's proposals).
93. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2044-45.
94. Golden, supra note 5, at 2133.
95. Id. at 2134.
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likely stand down between such a threat and its realization." 96
The fact that injunctive relief can only be achieved through
costly litigation means that the potential to seek injunctive relief is
important even for non-practicing patent holders, for whom licensing
revenues represent the only remuneration for a valuable patented
invention. For these entities, the ability to seek an injunction is an
important negotiation tool, and may be the only tool that a small nonpracticing patent holder (particularly an individual inventor) has to
balance the often far stronger bargaining position of an established
manufacturer licensee.
Moreover, the ability to seek an injunction does not imply that an
injunction will actually be granted. Particularly in the wake of the
Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., in
which it rejected a "general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances,"9 7 courts can and often do deny injunctive relief.
Justice Thomas, writing for the eBay majority, called for the lower
courts to adhere to the four-part equity test already established in the
case-law. 98 Under that balancing test, before a plaintiff may receive
injunctive relief it is required to demonstrate that: (i) it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (ii) remedies available at law are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (iii) considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and a defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (iv) the public interest would not be disserved by an
injunction. 99 Lower courts thus have the flexibility to stay or deny an
injunction when appropriate, and indeed have been exercising that
flexibility for the last several years.
The situation would be much worse if the threat of injunction
disappeared from the patent holder's legal arsenal and its only
available relief were an ex post award of damages. In that scenario,
any firm wishing to use another firm's invention would be invited to
begin immediately using the invention without even trying to obtain a
license from the patent owner and take its chances in court later. 100
This would be a patent infringers' charter and would provide an
96. Id.
97. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839-41 (2006) (quoting
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006)).
98.

Id. at 1839.

99. Id.
100. For those infringing implementers, the worst case scenario would merely be a
requirement to pay damages once a court had established the infringement.
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incentive for manufacturers to refuse beforehand to enter into license
agreements on reasonable terms, limiting patent owners to enforcing
their rights through what could be patent-by-patent, country-bycountry damages claims. In those circumstances, patent owners,
especially if they are small firms, would arguably prefer to settle even
for a license on terms that would not provide a fair return on their
investment, rather than face lengthy, onerous and uncertain court
proceedings for the award of damages.101 Faced with the prospect of
spending millions of dollars and several years in the courts, patent
holders (particularly smaller ones) would be forced to settle for
royalties that would be lower that the true value of their inventions.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have attempted to offer some thoughts on the
economic principles that can be applied to address the determination
of the royalty base and rate in the presence of complex products and
multiple relevant patent holders. The appropriate choice of a royalty
base has been the subject of heated debate for some years now. On the
one hand, the royalty rate base, in isolation, is irrelevant since the
royalty rate applied to that base can always be adjusted upwards or
downwards to match the selected base. This mathematical
indeterminacy suggests that a reasonable royalty payment can be
achieved either through the use of apportionment or reliance on the
entire market value rule. On the other hand, critics note that the
theoretical equivalence of the two approaches ignores the reality of
court procedure, in which juries can be improperly swayed by
consideration of the entire market value when only a narrow
component of the product is at issue.
We sympathize with the critics' concerns and agree that theory
cannot take complete precedence over practical realities. It is for this
very reason that we find that the entire market value rule should be
applied with some flexibility. Practical reasons call for the use of the
entire market value rule, beyond those situations in which the
patented component is the basis for the entire product demand. In
particular, component value is not always separable from full product
value, some components may enable others even though they do not
form the full basis of demand, and reporting and verifiability must be
In his reply to Lemley and Shapiro, Greg Sidak concludes that those authors'
101.
recommendations for patent reform, including in particular the denial of injunctive relief, are not
supported by conjecture, would result in bias in favor of the infringing party, and would create
more problems than they would solve. See Sidak, supra note 72.
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accounted for as well in choosing the best royalty base.
In setting reasonable royalty payments, we must keep in mind
both licensees and patent holders, and do our best not to bias the
licensing process to one or the other side. While licensees worry
about over compensation for patent holders deriving from an
improper use of the entire market value rule, if that rule is applied too
rigidly, it will lead to under compensation for patent holders.
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